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High-speed computerized trading, often called “high-frequency trading” (HFT), has increased
dramatically in financial markets over the last decade. In the US and Europe, it now accounts for
nearly one-half of all trades. Although evidence suggests that HFT contributes to the efficiency
of markets, there are concerns it also adds to market instability, especially during times of stress.
Currently, it is unclear how or why HFT produces these outcomes. In this paper, I use data from
NASDAQ to show that HFT synchronizes prices in financial markets, making the values of related
securities change contemporaneously. With a model, I demonstrate how price synchronization leads
to increased efficiency: prices are more accurate and transaction costs are reduced. During times
of stress, however, localized errors quickly propagate through the financial system if safeguards are
not in place. In addition, there is potential for HFT to enforce incorrect relationships between secu-
rities, making prices more (or less) correlated than economic fundamentals warrant. This research
highlights an important role that HFT plays in markets and helps answer several puzzling questions
that previously seemed difficult to explain: why HFT is so prevalent, why HFT concentrates in
certain securities and largely ignores others, and finally, how HFT can lower transaction costs yet
still make profits.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past 10 years, high-frequency trading (here-
after HFT) has gone from a small, niche strategy in fi-
nancial markets to the dominant form of trading. It cur-
rently accounts for approximately 55% of trading volume
in US equity markets, 40% in European equity markets,
and is quickly growing in Asian, fixed income, commod-
ity, foreign exchange, and nearly every other market[19].
Although a precise definition of HFT does not exist, it is
generally classified as autonomous computerized trading
that seeks quick profits using high-speed connections to
financial exchanges.
Policy makers across the globe are spending consider-
able effort deciding if and how to regulate HFT[20] On
the one hand, HFT appears to make markets more effi-
cient. Algorithmic trading in general, and HFT specifi-
cally, increases the accuracy of prices and lowers transac-
tion costs[1–4]. On the other hand, HFT appears to make
the financial system as a whole more fragile. The rapid
fall and subsequent rise in prices that occurred in US
markets on May 6, 2010 (known as the “Flash Crash”),
was, in part, due to HFT[5]. Because HFT firms do not
openly disclose their trading activities, it has so far been
unclear how and why HFT produces these outcomes; a
circumstance that has greatly increased the controversy
surrounding its existence.
In this paper, using a special dataset supplied by NAS-
DAQ, I present evidence that HFT synchronizes security
prices in financial markets. By ‘synchronize’, I mean the
following – to the extent that two securities are related
to one another, HFT activity ensures that a price change
in the first security coincides nearly instantaneously with
a similar price change in the second security. Synchro-
nization is a gargantuan task[21] tailor-made for HFT: it
is profitable for the firms that do it and can only be done
with high-speed computerized trade.
To understand the effects of price synchronization, I
modify a standard model of price formation[6] so that
it includes multiple related securities. I find that when
prices are synchronized, transaction costs are reduced,
prices are more accurate, and that informed investors –
those who always submit a buy (sell) order when the price
will be higher (lower) – make less profits.
The intuition behind these results is straightforward.
As an example, suppose that an event occurs which in-
creases the likelihood that country X will default on its
sovereign debt. This information is processed by spe-
cialized firms who quickly buy securities that track the
probability of X’s default. The prices of these securities
increase, and if markets are synchronized, then the prices
of all other securities adjust as well. As a result, an in-
vestor who purchases or sells any security in the market
receives a more accurate price. Transaction costs are re-
duced because liquidity providers are more confident in
market prices and require less of a price concession to
transact with an order. In finance, this is known as a
reduction in adverse selection costs[7–9].
If transaction costs are lower, then average investors
benefit from synchronization. So, who loses? When
prices are synchronized, information diffuses rapidly from
security to security and informed investors are made
somewhat redundant. In the model, they make less profit
as a result.
Although price synchronization is normally beneficial
in markets, it can also have harmful effects. When prices
are tightly connected to one another, localized errors
quickly propagate through the financial system. In ad-
dition, there is potential for incorrect relationships be-
tween securities to be enforced, making prices more (or
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FIG. 1: Increase of HFT activity and market efficiency over the last decade. (A) The percentage of HFT volume in US equities
(measured in shares) and European equities (measured in value) for 2005 to 2010. Values are estimates from the TABB Group.
(B) Average cost and average pricing error of transactions for 35 US stocks during the last full week of February in 2000, 2005,
and 2010. The diagram shows how the cost and error of a buyer initiated transaction are calculated (for a seller initiated
transaction, the sign of the cost is reversed). To normalize across stocks and time, costs and errors are measured in basis points
(1bps=.01%) and divided by the current market volatility as measured by the VIX index. Error bars report the standard error
of the mean across the 35 stocks.
less) correlated than economic fundamentals warrant. Fi-
nally, during times of market stress, HFT firms are im-
pelled to leave the market if their systems observe events
outside the parameters they are programmed to handle –
a circumstance that causes liquidity to disappear at the
precise time it is needed the most.
EVIDENCE
In Fig. 1, I show the rapid increase in HFT volume and
the corresponding increase in market efficiency over the
last decade. In Fig. 1(A), HFT estimates are from the
TABB Group. In Fig. 1(B), the cost of a buyer initiated
transaction is measured as the transaction price, p, minus
the current prevailing midpoint price for the security, m,
(for a seller initiated transaction, the cost is m−p). The
transaction error is the absolute difference between the
transaction price, p, and the midpoint price 1 minute
later, x, (see the diagram in the figure). Data is from
Thomson Reuters and includes 35 stocks during the last
full week of February in 2000, 2005, and 2010. The 35
stocks are a subset of the 40 large-cap stocks available
in the NASDAQ HFT data that is used below (5 of the
stocks from the NASDAQ data are not available in the
Reuters data for all time periods).
In Fig. 2(A), I show how prices have become more syn-
chronized over the last decade. Using the same data as
in Fig. 1(B), I measure the average normalized price re-
sponse of security i to a price movement in security j 6= i
(see the supplemental material for details[10]). In 2000,
it took several minutes for a price movement in stock j
to be fully incorporated into the price of stock i. In 2005,
this occurred in about 1 minute, and in 2010 it took less
than 10 seconds. Fig. 2(B) shows that it is HFT activity
that keeps prices synchronized. Using data from NAS-
DAQ that flags HFT activity in 120 stocks during the
last week of February, 2010 (see the supplemental mate-
rial for a full description of the data[10]), I take the 40
largest stocks and calculate the average normalized price
response of stock i to a price movement in stock j (black
curve). I separate this response into the amount due
to HFT activity (green curve), non-HFT activity (blue
curve), and an amount that could not be categorized
either way (red curve). As seen in the figure, an over-
whelming majority of the initial price response is due to
HFT activity.
MODEL
To study the effects of price synchronization in detail,
I modify a standard model of price formation[6] so that
it includes multiple related securities. In total n securi-
ties, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, exist and are traded asynchronously
over a single period. During the trading period, one unit-
sized order to buy or sell is submitted for each security,
Oi ∈ {Bi, Si}. Submitted orders are immediately trans-
acted by liquidity providers at the fair price, i.e., at the
expected future price of the security, pi. The original
price of security i is mi, and the final price at the end of
trading, xi, increases or decreases with equal probability,
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FIG. 2: Normalized price response of stock i to a price movement in stock j 6= i. (A) The mean price response for 35 US stocks
during the last full week of February in 2000, 2005, and 2010. The standard error of the mean across the 35 stocks is shown
in gray. (B) For 2010, the price response of the full 40 US stocks (black) is decomposed into the amount due to HFT activity
(green), non-HFT activity (blue), and an amount that could not be categorized (red). Again, standard errors are shown in
shaded color.
xi ∈ {x+i , x−i }, where x+i = mi + δi and x−i = mi − δi,
with δi > 0. So in summary, for each security i, one order
is submitted, transacts at price pi, and the final price is
either δi higher or δi lower than the original price.
In real markets, informed individuals correlate their
orders with future price changes, i.e., buying tends to
correspond with increases in prices and selling with de-
creases in prices. To include this effect, I assume that
a buy order is more likely when the final price of the
security is higher, and that a sell order is more likely
when it is lower. For security i, P(Bi|x+i ) = φi > 0.5
and P(Bi|x−i ) = (1 − φi) < 0.5. Finally, in real mar-
kets, securities are related to one another so that their
price changes are correlated. To include this effect, I
assume that the price change of security i and j are cor-
related with correlation coefficient, ρi,j 6= 0. To complete
the model, I assume that the orders for securities are in-
dependent of one another, except through the indirect
dependence caused by the correlations already assumed,
P(O1, O2, . . . |x1, x2, . . . ) = P(O1|x1)P(O2|x2) . . . .
With this simple model, synchronizing the prices of
securities (allowing the price of security j to affect the
price of security i) lowers transaction costs and increases
the accuracy of prices. See the supplemental material
for a full proof[10]. Here, I show the result with an ex-
ample. Assume that the market contains only two se-
curities, n = 2, and the initial price of each security
is m1 = m2 = 50 which can increase or decrease by
δ1 = δ2 = 1. For both securities φ1 = φ2 = 0.75,
and their price changes are correlated with ρ1,2 = 0.8.
The diagram in Fig. 3 analyzes the expected transaction
cost, c(B1) = E[p1 −m1|B1], and average pricing error,
e(B1) = E[|x1 − p1||B1], for a buy order in security 1,
when prices are and are not synchronized (see the supple-
mental material for details[10]). As seen in the diagram,
by allowing order flow in security 2 to affect the price
of security 1, a buy order for security 1 costs less and is
priced more accurately.
When prices are synchronized, transaction costs are
lower in the model. For this reason, average investors –
individuals who do not correlate their orders with final
price changes – do not lose as much money. Who, then,
is compensating average investors? When prices are syn-
chronized, information diffuses rapidly from security to
security and informed investors who trade different but
related securities are forced to compete with one another.
They make less profit as a result. In the above example,
their average profit is reduced from 0.5 to 0.46875 per
transaction[10].
Price synchronization is normally beneficial in markets,
but it also can have harmful effects. If shared misconcep-
tions exist in the population of investors within the model
– causing for example, a large number of sell orders to
be submitted even though the final prices of most securi-
ties are higher – then synchronization makes transaction
prices less accurate. In addition, when prices are tightly
connected to one another, errors quickly spread through
the financial system. To mitigate this risk, HFT firms can
program their systems to exit the market when errors are
detected. But determining the difference between an ex-
treme event and an error is precisely the type of problem
that machines find difficult[11]. Machines that contin-
ually stay in the market risk propagating errors when
they arise. Machines that leave the market at the first
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FIG. 3: Diagram of the model showing that transaction costs are reduced and prices are more accurate with synchronized
prices. Only a buy order for security 1 is analyzed. On the left, the price of security 1 and 2 are not synchronized. The buy
order for security 1 transacts at 50.5, giving a transaction cost of 0.5 and an average transaction price error of 0.75. On the
right, the prices are synchronized. If the buy order for security 1 arrives before the order for security 2 (top), the analysis is the
same as if prices where not synchronized. If a buy or sell order for security 2 arrives first (middle or bottom), this affects the
price of security 1 as shown. Transaction costs and errors are calculated for each case and averaged. Final results are shown at
the bottom in reverse red highlight.
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FIG. 4: Stocks with higher HFT activity have stronger correlations with other stocks. These correlations correspond with
economic structure. (A) Plot of stock correlation vs. the fraction of volume due to HFT for that stock. Correlations are
between the 30 second returns of the stock and the equal-weighted average 30 second returns of all 120 stocks. Volume is
measured in shares. (B) Minimum spanning tree derived from the 30 second correlation matrix for the 40 large-cap stocks.
The ticker for each stock is shown on the corresponding node, and nodes are color-coded according to GICS sector.
50 2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
−0.005
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
0.02
0.025
Time (s)
Sm
oo
th
ed
 p
ric
e 
tr
aj
ec
to
ry
 
 
Average
C
 
 
A B
FIG. 5: Comparison of the price trajectories of financial securities and the motion of schooling fish. (A) Price trajectories of
40 large-cap US stocks from 1pm to 4pm on February 25, 2010 (from the NASDAQ dataset). The mean trajectory is shown
in black. Price trajectories are the change in logarithmic price from 1pm to the current time measured every 30 seconds and
are smoothed by taking a moving average with window size 20. The plot is enlarged from 3:02pm to 3:25pm with the following
stocks in color: AAPL (red), AMGN (cyan), CMCSA (magenta), HON (yellow), CELG (blue), MOS (dark green), BHI (light
green), SWN (pink). (B) Tracked motion of eight schooling mosquitofish. The image consists of two superimposed frames at
15s and 17s of the movie provided as supplemental material in[18].
sign of an abnormality will often disappear at the precise
time they are most needed. The end result is a financial
system that becomes unstable during times of stress and
behaves very much like US markets did during the Flash
Crash[5].
HFT ACTIVITY
Although HFT firms synchronize prices, this does not
imply it is their main activity. Just how important is syn-
chronization to HFT? In Fig. 4A, I plot the relationship
between the level of HFT activity within a stock and the
correlation strength of that stock to other stocks. Corre-
lations are between the 30 second returns of each stock
and the equal-weighted average 30 second returns of all
120 stocks. HFT activity is measured as the fraction of
overall share volume attributable to HFT for each stock.
The correlation between these variables is 0.80, and the
R2 from a linear fit is 0.64. HFT activity varies sig-
nificantly from security to security, and synchronization
explains the majority of this variance.
To determine if HFT is enforcing plausible economic
relationships between securities, I calculate the minimum
spanning tree of the correlation network[12] for the 40
large-cap stocks (Fig. 4B). The ticker for each stock is
shown on the corresponding node, and nodes are color-
coded according to their GICS (Global Industry Classi-
fication Standard) sector. The correlation structure of
these stocks at 30 second intervals – largely set by HFT
– corresponds well with the economic relationships of the
companies.
Most HFT firms are run by scientists and engineers,
and it is unlikely that they pay close attention to eco-
nomic fundamentals and create a map of market struc-
ture that updates as fundamentals change. Instead, it is
more likely that HFT firms are dependent on feedback
mechanisms that punish them when the structure they
enforce is incorrect. If and how this feedback mechanism
works is an important area of future research.
ANALOGY TO ANIMAL GROUPS
It is interesting to compare the above results to re-
cent findings in ecology. In animal groups, synchronized
behavior facilitates information transfer between indi-
viduals, which increases the accuracy of decisions and
allows fewer resources to be allocated to information
gathering[13, 14]. A simple example is a school of fish.
By synchronizing their behavior, fish can scan their envi-
ronment using “many eyes”, which allows them to quickly
evade threats or move towards potential food sources.
Financial markets are similar. In markets, the state
of the economy is monitored by a large number of in-
vestors who quickly broadcast any changes to each other
and the rest of society via price movements[15, 16]. By
synchronizing prices, HFT allows the “many eyes” of dif-
ferent investors to function as one coherent group, which
results in price trajectories that look like the motions of
schooling fish (Fig. 5).
Just as in animal groups, synchrony in financial mar-
kets leads to an increase in efficiency and a reduction
in the resources spent on informed individuals. How-
6ever, also as in animal groups, synchronization can
have harmful effects; shared misconceptions among in-
dividuals in a group are amplified when behaviors are
synchronized[14, 17].
CONCLUSIONS
The evidence above suggests that HFT plays an impor-
tant role in financial markets. By synchronizing prices,
HFT facilitates information transfer between investors,
which increases the accuracy of prices and redistributes
profits from informed individuals to average investors by
reducing transaction costs.
Synchronization, however, is not a panacea for mar-
kets. When prices are tightly connected to one another,
errors can quickly propagate throughout the financial
system if safeguards are not in place. In addition, if
shared misconceptions exist among investors, they are
amplified so that prices are less accurate overall. Finally,
synchronization can create spurious structure in markets
if information about the changing relationships of securi-
ties does not make its way to the high-frequency domain.
In sum, these results help answer several puzzling ques-
tions about HFT that previously seemed difficult to ex-
plain: (1) why HFT is so prevalent, (2) why HFT in-
creases market efficiency under normal conditions but
leads to instability during times of stress, (3) why HFT
concentrates in certain securities and not in others, and
finally, (4) how HFT can lower transaction costs yet still
make profits.
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